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Abstract
This paper investigates the turnout in European Parliamentary elections by analyz-
ing the four EP elections from 1999 to 2014 in 155 regions in EU-12. We use a 
number of econometric techniques that account for spatial dependence, also deal-
ing with heteroskedasticity and endogeneity. The results confirm the role of spatial 
spillovers and indicate a significant role for GDP per capita, unemployment, age, 
institutional and electoral variables in influencing turnout. Finally, we disentangle 
the direct and indirect effects of the regional variable in affecting turnout.
Keywords European Parliamentary elections · Voter turnout · Sub-national 
variations · Spatial econometrics
JEL Classification D72 · C33
1 Introduction
Political participation is the lifeforce of democracy. The existing research on this 
topic has established some robust patterns. A large body of theoretical and empiri-
cal literature has identified a set of individual—as well as aggregate-level variables 
explaining variations in electoral turnout within a single country and between coun-
tries (see Smets and van Ham 2013; Cancela and Geys 2016).
In recent years, scholars have increasingly emphasized the role of geographical 
influences on voting. They highlight that voting behavior is not fully explained 
by individual or aggregate characteristics. Rather it is the result of a complex 
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and multidimensional process that occurs in space and crucially reflects—and 
is mediated by—the social and geographical environment where individuals 
are located and interact (Agnew 1987; Pattie and Johnston 2000). These loca-
tion-specific factors are the outcome of a common background and shared val-
ues and may influence voting behavior through a variety of possible mechanisms 
like social networks and political discussion (Books and Prysby 1991; Huckfeldt 
and Sprague 1995) or shared economic experiences (Pattie and Johnston 1995). 
The general contribution of this literature is that localized, rather than general, 
analyses of what affect levels of electoral participation may be more successful 
in accounting for variations in turnout. Within this field, an emerging stream of 
research incorporates spatial econometrics techniques to uncover the influence of 
neighbors on voter turnout. Most of this research focuses on the US (Tam Cho 
and Rudolph 2008; Wing and Walker 2010; Foley and Demšar 2013; Lacombe 
et al. 2014). Other studies investigate the Italian contest (Shin and Agnew 2011), 
while Mansley and Demšar (2015) focus on London mayoral elections.
This paper contributes to this literature exploring through spatial modeling the 
role of spillover effects from one region to another in explaining variations in 
turnout in European Parliamentary (henceforth EP) elections. We focus on the 
four EP elections between 1999 and 2014 in the EU-12, for 155 regions, by inte-
grating traditional predictors with regional spatial and contextual conditions that 
enable and constrain voter decisions. To the best of our knowledge, this issue 
has not yet been considered in relation to the EP elections. Empirical studies of 
the determinants of voter turnout in EP elections are mainly cross-national analy-
ses based on aggregate data (Mattila 2003) or a mix of individual and aggregate 
data (Holbot 2012). Recently, Fiorino et  al. (2019) have explored sub-national 
variations in participation in EP elections using a multilevel modeling approach 
that allows them to analyze both regional and national data. Nevertheless, despite 
the large set of covariates these previous studies consider, the methodological 
approach they use does not allow to account for potential unobservable geograph-
ical or spatial factors that may affect electoral participation in EP elections.
Figure 1 shows the quartiles of turnout in the 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014 elec-
tions across 155 European regions respectively. The figure significantly denotes 
changes in the countries’ and regions’ level of turnout during the four considered 
EP elections. It also shows that there are well-defined clusters of regions charac-
terized by a high and low turnout respectively, indicating that regions that behave 
similarly are usually close to each other. Furthermore, large evidence supports the 
existence of economic interdependence among (cross-border) neighboring Euro-
pean regions, as well as the presence of spillover effects across national borders 
(see Ertur et al. 2006). Recall that socio-economic factors are important contex-
tual drivers of voter turnout (defined at regional level). All these arguments sug-
gest that a more complete discussion of the determinants of voter turnout in the 
EP elections requires exploring spillover effects on turnout in bordering regions.
The paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 describes the spatial features of turn-
out. Section 3 introduces the model specification and the data, Sect.  4 presents 
the results and provides a discussion. Conclusions are drawn in Sect. 5.
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2  Spatial properties of turnout
To analyze space dependence, the best-known indicator is Moran’s I (MI) (Moran 
1950). MI relates the value of a given variable to the values of the same variable 
in neighboring areas, namely its spatial lag. The intuition is that socio-economic 
phenomena might not be isolated in space and what is happening in a certain loca-
tion may be correlated to what is happening in neighboring locations. We based the 
calculation of this measure of spatial autocorrelation on a row standardized queen 
spatial weight matrix W, where islands are connected to the closest region. Queen 
contiguity scheme makes a region to be connected to other regions if they touch 
for at least one point of the border, avoiding dropping neighboring relationships for 
regions even from two different countries. This allows for spatial spillovers across 
Fig. 1  turnout in EP elections
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regions belonging to the same and/or different countries. When the spatial matrix 
standardized by row, the MI varies between − 1 and 1. A positive coefficient points 
to positive spatial autocorrelation, i.e. clusters of similar values can be identified. 
The reverse represents regimes with negative associations, i.e. dissimilar values 
clustered together in a map. A value close to zero indicates a random spatial pattern.
One advantage of this statistic is that it can be visualized in a so-called Moran 
scatterplot, with the spatial lag of the (standardized) variable on the vertical axis 
and the original (standardized) variable on the horizontal axis. Thus, each point in 
the scatterplot represents a combination of a location’s value and its correspond-
ing values in the surrounding regions, i.e. the spatial lag. The x- and y-axes divide 
the scatterplot into 4 quadrants (anticlockwise from top right): in the first and third 
(high–high, HH, and low–low, LL, respectively) a location that exhibits a high (low) 
value of the variable is surrounded by locations also with a high (low) value for the 
variable. In the second and fourth (low–high, LH, and high-low, HL, respectively) 
a location with a low (high) value of the variable is surrounded by locations with 
a high (low) value for the variable. A concentration of points in the first and third 
quadrants means positive spatial dependence (nearby locations have similar val-
ues), while the concentration of points in the second and fourth quadrants reveals 
the presence of negative spatial dependence (i.e. nearby locations have dissimilar 
values).
The Moran scatterplots (Fig. 2) based on a queen row standardized spatial weight 
matrix show positive slopes and the concentration of points representing the regions 
in the first and third quadrant suggests that areas with high (low) turnout are clus-
tered in space. In our case, at the top of the Moran scatterplot, MI is shown and is 
quite stable above 0.60. This means that there is spatial persistence over time, with 
well-defined clusters of regions characterized by high and low turnout, respectively.
Nevertheless, a closer look at the points in the Moran scatterplots reveals that 
their distribution is much more widespread in 1999 than in 2014, with a group of 
Belgian regions steadily located in the upper part of the first quadrant.1 Despite the 
fairly stable value of MI, this indicates a changing pattern in EU turnout. Such a pat-
tern, without altering the ranking of EU regions in terms of turnout, signals greater 
similarity over time.
3  Model specification, variables and methodology
The analysis includes 12 EU countries (Portugal, Spain, France, Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, UK, Germany, Italy, Greece, Austria, and Sweden) for 155 
regions.2 The data for turnout is from the European Election Database and national 
sources regarding four elections: 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014.
1 We have to bear in mind in Belgium voting is compulsory.
2 For the method used, balanced panel data are essential. Greece is analyzed as a single region because 
of the lack of data for 2014. In the other cases, we refer to NUTS-2 regions with the exception of the 
UK, Spain and Germany where NUTS-1 regions are used. Despite differences in size and administrative 
importance, it is common practice to consider these regions together. Finland has been excluded because 
regional data are only available for 1999 and 2004.
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The time dimension of the data is used via a panel structure. In addition, we 
assume that the turnout in EP elections is affected by several regional and national 
factors, including the average level of turnout in the neighboring regions, and we 
estimate the following regression:
where Turnout is a n × 1 vector of the dependent variable, that is the number of votes 
on registered citizens in each region at election year t. t is the election year (1999, 
2004, 2009, 2014) and ut the i.i.d. residuals. W is the n × n Queen spatial matrix, and 
Wt is a space–time spatial weight matrix defined as  It⊗ W where ⊗ represents the 
Kronecker product and  It the identity matrix of size t. The n × 1 vector WtTurnout 
(1)Turnoutt = a0 + tTurnoutt + a2t + a3t + At + ut
Fig. 2  Moran scatterplots
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defines the spatially weighted linear combination of the turnout in neighboring 
regions, and the coefficient ρ measures the strength of the relation between turn-
out in a region (the dependent variable) and the neighbors.3 Following Gimpel et al. 
(2004), we estimate pooled data from the four election years, including dummy vari-
ables At for each year (using 1999 as the baseline). Equation (1) is estimated with 
a standard maximum likelihood approach (ML) (Anselin 1988) and with a heter-
oskedastic-consistent ML (Cribari-Neto 2004). Furthermore, we perform robustness 
using alternative methods that account for the endogeneity of the spatial autoregres-
sive coefficient, namely two-stage least squares (S2SLS) and spatial two-stage least 
squares with a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) estimator of 
the variance–covariance matrix (S2SLSHAC), as well as through generalized spatial 
two-stage least squares (GS2SLS) (Kelejian and Prucha 1999). Finally, we estimate 
the model with generalized spatial two-stage least squares accounting for heteroske-
dasticity in the error term (GS2SLSHET), using spatial lags of exogenous variables 
as instruments (Kelejian and Prucha 2010). Following Anselin and Rey (1991), the 
choice of the spatial lag model is performed through a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 
test on OLS estimates to choose the spatial model (Anselin and Rey 1991).4
The vector SOCEC includes several regional economic as well as socio-eco-
nomic variables at the aggregate level.5 GDP per capita (the logarithm for GDP 
per capita in PPS, source of data Eurostat Regional Database)6 is the usual indicator 
of economic development (Shachar and Nalebuff 1999), Unemployment measures 
the percentage of long-term unemployed in total unemployment (source: Eurostat 
Regional Database) to control for labor market conditions (Verba et al. 1995; Rosen-
stone 1982). The vector also includes Density (the log of the number of inhabitants 
per  km2, source Eurostat Regional Database for population and Cambridge Econo-
metrics for regional areas) (Oliver 2000) and the Dependency ratio (the percentage 
of people aged over 65 years and youngsters between 20 and 24, source Eurostat 
Regio Database) (Franklin and Holbot 2011). Participation in EP elections, and 
more generally attitudes towards the EU, may be based on the experiences of voters 
with the EU, for example, through funds that they receive from Bruxelles. Objec-
tive 1 regions is a dummy variable equal to 1 if regions are below 75% of EU GDP 
per capita and thus receive the majority of EU Structural Funds, and 0 otherwise 
4 According to the decision rule (Anselin et  al. 1996), if the LM lag is more significant than the LM 
error, and the robust LM lag is significant but the robust LM error is not, then the appropriate model is 
the spatial lag model. Conversely, if the LM error is more significant than the LM lag, and the robust LM 
error is significant but the robust LM lag is not, then the appropriate model is the spatial error model.
5 When using aggregate-level data inference may suffer from aggregation bias. However, this problem is 
far less severe with regional-level data (see Kim et al. 2003).
6 Due to lack of data, the following years are used: 2000, 2004, 2009 and 2013.
3 As for the estimation of the Moran’s, the matrix W is a queen row standardized spatial weight matrix, 
where islands are connected to the closest region. Results are robust to different neighbor definitions. As 
W is standardized by row, ρ varies between − 1 and 1.
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(Mattila 2003, Flickinger and Studlar 2007; Fiorino et al. 2019).7 Finally, the vari-
able Education measures the share of people aged 15–64 with upper secondary 
and post-secondary non-tertiary education (source: Eurostat Regio Database, lev-
els 3 and 4). Multiple explanations have been proposed to explain the link between 
education and turnout. Among other effects, education impacts the vote because it 
enhances political interest and political knowledge, encourages the sense of civic 
responsibility and increases political efficacy (among others, Nie et al. 1996; Gal-
lego 2010).
The vector POLINST includes a set of politico-institutional variables. Institu-
tional quality captures at the regional level good governance, that is high impartial-
ity and quality of public service delivery, along with low corruption (source of data 
for 2014 is Teorell et al. 2020 and for 1999, 2004 and 2009 is Crescenzi et al. 2016). 
A perception of bad quality of political and institutional systems may compromise 
citizens’ satisfaction, lower generalized trust and lead many individuals to abstain 
from elections (Rothstein and Teorell 2008; Sundstrom and Stockemer 2015). Her-
findahl gov and Herfindahl opp measure respectively the sum of the squared seat 
shares of all government or opposition parties. These variables are meant to cap-
ture the fractionalization of the government and the opposition, respectively. They 
are defined at the national level (source: Beck et  al. 2001). Compulsory voting 
and Week vote are linked to the national electoral systems and have largely been 
explored in the literature (among others, Franklin 2002). While compulsory voting 
leads to higher turnout rates, elections on weekdays decrease electoral participation 
since people follow their daily routines. The sources of both these variables are the 
national electoral agencies. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics.
Table 1  Descriptive statistics Variable Mean SD Min. Max.
Turnout 0.4997 0.1637 0.1960 0.9444
GDP per capita 10.084 0.2688 9.2670 11.135
Unemployment 0.3902 0.1312 0.0410 0.7540
Density 5.1310 1.1328 1.1940 8.8990
Dependency ratio 0.9537 0.2424 0.3952 2.0510
Objective 1 regions 0.2542 0.4305 0.0000 1.0000
Education 0.4384 0.1412 0.8400 0.7180
Institutional quality 0.7379 0.3956 − 2.4210 1.6365
Herfindahl gov. 0.6817 0.2328 0.1810 1.0000
Herfindahl opp. 0.5838 0.1672 0.2199 0.8554
Compulsory voting 0.0774 0.2620 0.0000 1.0000
Week vote 0.1548 0.3620 0.0000 1.0000
7 This dummy variable is based on information available online (see http://ec.europ a.eu/regio nal_polic y/
index .cfm/en/polic y/evalu ation s/data-for-resea rch/).
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4  Results and discussion
Our results are displayed in Table  2, with the OLS regression. The LM tests for 
autocorrelation applied to the OLS residuals clearly show that spatial dependence in 
the form of spatial lag is present in the residuals. The Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) performed on the spatial lag ML model and OLS confirms the choice of the 
former, whose AIC is equal to − 643.59 against the − 582.24 of OLS.
When the spatial structure is included in the model, the value of the depend-
ent variable in one spatial unit is affected by the independent variables in nearby 
units. In this case, the assumption of uncorrelated error terms as well as inde-
pendent observations is violated. As a result, parameter estimates are biased and 
inefficient. Furthermore, as shown by the Breush Pagan test, the presence of het-
eroscedasticity in the OLS and spatial lag models is a source of additional ineffi-
ciency in the standard error estimation. This calls for the estimation of heteroske-
dastic robust models, in columns 3, 5, and 7.
However, the spatial lag models estimated using different estimators show con-
sistent results, highlighting the robustness of our specification even when heter-
oskedasticity is accounted for. Although the standard errors increase, overall, the 
statistical significance of the parameters does not change.
The presence of a positive significant spatial autoregressive parameter ρ signals 
the existence of global externalities due to how the spatial multiplier is defined, i.e. 
as (I − Wρ)−1 = I + Wρ + W2ρ2+ ··· + WNρN, where I is an N × N the identity matrix. 
Thus, turnout is determined by each region’s own factors as well as those of imme-
diate neighbors (ρW), second-order neighbors (W2ρ2) and so forth.
Indeed, a shock in region i is transmitted to its neighbors by parameter ρ 
related to turnout in neighbors and, in turn, this is transmitted back to region i 
through  , reinitiating the process until the effect becomes negligible for N tend-
ing towards infinity (LeSage and Fischer 2008).
The spatial autoregressive parameter is comprised between 0.0851 and 0.0888 
corresponding, in scalar terms, to a spatial multiplier around 1.09. This implies that 
around 90% of turnout is explained by direct effects, i.e. the impact of a change in 
a variable in the same region i, while the remainder, the so-called indirect or spillo-
ver effect, is given by the effect arising from changes in a variable in the neighbors. 
Note that in an OLS ρ = 0 thus, if there is spatial dependence in the dependent vari-
able, the regression coefficients are upward biased. We argue that one of the possible 
sources of spillover effects might be commuting (LeSage and Dominguez 2012).
We discuss the results for regional variables when we comment direct, indirect 
and total effects. Here we comment on the national variables. Compulsory voting 
has the expected positive effect on turnout, whereas Week vote has the expected 
negative effect since voting becomes more costly. In both cases, the coefficients 
are very consistent and significant at the highest level. The fractionalization of 
the government and opposition have opposite effects on turnout. The significance 
of the former is smaller than for the latter.
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Direct, indirect and total effects for the regional variables are shown in Table 3 
to offer a richer interpretation of our results in terms of spillover effects. Indeed, 
change in a single observation (region) associated with each explanatory variable 
may affect the region itself (direct effect) and potentially all the other regions 
indirectly (an indirect effect) (LeSage and Pace 2009). The positive and sig-
nificant GDP per capita suggests that an improvement in economic conditions 
promotes the political engagement of citizens (Radcliff 1992). This is valid for 
a change in the region of study, but also if a shock occurs in the neighborhood 
because of social and economic interconnections between regions.8 Dissatisfac-
tion in labor market conditions is a salient issue to be relevant for the decision of 
whether to vote or not. The results show that Unemployment is positively related 
to voting in EP elections, which provides evidence in favor of the mobilization 
approach (Rosenstone 1982).
The Dependency ratio is also positively correlated with the turnout: the oldest 
segment of the population is more likely to vote than the youngest. This confirms 
that the age structure of the population helps to explain variations in the electoral 
behavior of voters.
Objective 1 regions have significantly negative coefficients. Although margin-
alized areas receive funds from the EU, they appear less interested in European 
Table 3  Estimates of direct, 
indirect and total effects based 
on the estimates of ML models 
in Table 2
Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 10%. In 
brackets, direct, indirect, and total effects and related t-statistics 
computed using 1000 draws from the estimated variance–covariance 
matrix of parameters (the spatial multiplier (I− ρW)−1 is calculated 
every draw
Direct Indirect Total
GDP per capita 0.0603*** 0.0062*** 0.0665***
(3.0910) (1.9518) (3.0603)
Unemployment 0.1163*** 0.1194* 0.1282***
(2.7948) (1.9015) (2.7854)
Density 0.0018 0.0002 − 0.0019
(0.3519) (0.3019) (0.3489)
Dependency ratio 0.0999*** 0.0103*** 0.1102***
(5.0946) (2.4309) (5.0621)
Education − 0.0033 − 0.0034 − 0.0369
(− 0.9235) (− 0.8130) (− 0.9213)
Institutional quality 0.0259** 0.0027 0.0285**
(2.1334) (1.6443) (2.1285)
Objective 1 regions − 0.0021** − 0.0022* − 0.0238**
(− 2.3429) (− 1.7272) (− 2.3366)
8 Note that the estimated coefficients and the direct effects do not match perfectly. The difference is due 
to the positive feedback effect arising from impacts passing through neighboring regions and back to the 
region itself, given by the W matrix.
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politics than in other areas. The responsiveness and effectiveness of institutions at 
the regional level enhances the willingness of people to engage in voting.
There is no significant relationship between population density and turnout. The 
often-found results that in relatively low-density areas relationships are closer and 
lead to ‘social pressure’ to vote (Overbye 1995) are possibly undone by the per-
ceived distance of the EP. Also Education does not impact voter turnout, a result 
that is not new among previous studies on European democracies (among others, 
Lijphart 1997; Norris 2002; Teorell, et  al. 2007), but that is at odds with several 
works on political behavior (e.g., Burden 2009; Gallego 2010).
5  Conclusions
This paper analyzes the geographical features of voter turnout in the four EP elec-
tions held from 1999 to 2014 in 155 European regions. We find some spillover 
effects that are presumably due to commuting, cultural traits, and values that neigh-
boring communities share. Our results point out how changes in some determinants 
in a region influence voter turnout in the same region (direct effects) as well as turn-
out in the neighboring ones (indirect effects), indicating that there may be additional 
benefits to turnout that spill-over the border of a region. Indirect effects are smaller 
than direct effects, but failing to account for them results in a partial understanding 
of the interrelation between dependent variables and turnout.
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